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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Jurisdiction over this matter is conferred pursuant to 
Section 78-2A-3(2)(a)t U.C.A. (1986). This section provides in 
part that the Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over 
"final orders and decrees of state and local agencies or 
appeals from the district court review of them...." 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING BELOW 
The plaintiffs-respondents filed an action for 
declaratory judgment in Third District Court to determine the 
validity of the Salt Lake City-County Board of Health's 
(hereafter "the Board") Food Service/Food Establishment 
Licensing Fee Standard (hereafter "Licensing Fee Standard"). 
The respective parties stipulated to facts and issues for 
determination and each submitted motions for summary judgment. 
(R-108-113) The District Court issued a minute entry on June 
24, 1987, granting plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. 
(R-161) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were 
subsequently signed on August 18, 1987. (Attached as Exhibit 
A.) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues submitted to this court by this appeal are 
as follows: 
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1. Whether the District Court erred in ruling that 
the Board does not have statutory authority to adopt the 
Licensing Fee Standard. 
2. Whether the Licensing Fee Standard adopted by the 
Board amounts to a fee rather than a tax. 
3. Whether the Board's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, prepared pursuant to statute in an 
administrative rule-making setting, must be substantially 
supported by evidence presented in a public hearing. 
STATUTES AND ORDINANCES DETERMINATIVE OF THE CASE 
1. Section 26-24-14. A local health department shall 
have in addition to all other powers and duties imposed on it, 
the following powers and duties... 
(14) establish and collect appropriate fees, to 
accept, use and administer all federal, state, or private 
donations or grants of funds, property, services, or materials 
for public health purposes, and to make such agreements, not 
inconsistent with law, as may be required as a condition to 
receiving such donation or grant.... 
2. Section 26-24-18. The treasurer of a health 
department shall, on organization of the department, create a 
health department fund to which shall be credited any moneys 
appropriated or otherwise made available by participating 
counties, cities, or other local political subdivisions and any 
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moneys received from the state, federal government, or from 
surpluses, grants, fees or donations for local health 
purposes. Any moneys credited to this fund shall be expended 
only for maintenance and operation of the local health 
department and claims or demands against the fund shall be 
allowed on certification by the health officer or other 
employee of the local health department designated by the board. 
3. Section 26-24-16. (1) Municipalities or counties 
involved in the establishment and operation of local health 
departments shall fund such health departments with 
appropriations from the General Fund or from the levy of a tax, 
or in part by such an appropriation and in part by such a levy 
under Section 17-5-62. 
(2) A local health department may be funded as 
provided by law from local, state, and federal funds within 
local levy ceilings, or through a separate ceiling exempt tax 
under Section 59-2-911, which may not exceed .0004, or in part 
by each. Local funds from either tax source shall be 
appropriated by the local governing authorities participating 
in such local health department. 
4. Section 26-24-20. (Attached as Exhibit B.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal involves a review of the District Court's 
determination that the Licensing Fee Standard adopted by the 
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Board is invalid. Third District Court Judge Richard H. 
Moffat, in an action filed by respondents for declaratory 
judgment, ordered the return of the Licensing Fee Standard 
assessments collected by the Board and restrained the Board 
from assessing further charges pursuant to the Licensing Fee 
Standard, 
The Board contends that the District Court erred in 
ruling that the Board does not have authority to impose charges 
such as those specified in the Licensing Fee Standard, that the 
Board's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were 
insufficient because they were not specifically supported by 
evidence presented at the public hearing, and that the 
provisions of the Licensing Fee Standard amount to a tax. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Board adopted the Licensing Fee Standard in order 
to defray some of the costs of the Salt Lake City-County Health 
Department's (hereafter "Health Department") food inspection 
program. The Licensing Fee Standard establishes fee categories 
and fee amounts ranging from $15.00 to $100.00 per year, 
relative to the size and complexity of the restaurants and food 
establishments inspected by the Health Department. (Licensing 
Fee Standard attached as Exhibit C) As required by Utah State 
Food Service Regulations, Section 10-101, food service 
establishments are inspected by the Health Department at least 
two times per year. 
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At the time the standard was presented for public 
hearing, the actual cost of the food inspection program, 
including personnel costs and some overhead, was estimated to 
be approximately $430,000.00, and the Licensing Fee Standard 
was estimated to generate $156,000.00. (Findings of Fact, 
Exhibit A) The estimated cost does not include laboratory, 
office, equipment, telephone, training, insurance, 
transportation, and clerical support costs. 
Fees collected pursuant to the Licensing Fee Standard, 
as indicated in the Affidavit of Auditor Nelson G. Williams, 
(submitted to the District Court and attached as Exhibit D), 
are accounted for separately from county general funds and, 
pursuant to Section 26-24-18, are reserved in a Health 
Department account exclusively for the food inspection 
program. (R-194) The fees collected to date have not been 
expended or appropriated by the Salt Lake County Board of 
County Commissioners but have been held in trust pending 
disposition of this appeal. (Exhibit D). 
In adopting the Licensing Fee Standard, the Board, 
pursuant to state law, published notice of the hearing on the 
Licensing Fee Standard on August 10 and 23, 1986 in the Salt 
Lake Tribune and the Deseret News. (R-73) A public hearing on 
the Licensing Fee Standard was conducted on September 10, 1986, 
by a Board-appointed hearing officer from the Health 
Department. Approximately thirty citizens appeared at the 
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hearing and many of these submitted oral and written comments. 
(R-60) At this hearing, the hearing officer announced that a 
summary of the hearing and written comments would be submitted 
to the Board before its next meeting and that interested 
parties could attend the meeting and make additional comments 
before the Board if they so desired. 
At the October 2f 1986 hearing, the Board, having 
received a summary of comments from the September hearing, 
written comments from the public and Health Department staff, 
and proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, accepted 
further oral comments from private parties and Health 
Department staff in attendance. (R-66-72, 82) At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the Board, upon the motion of Board 
member. Dr. John Bevan, voted to accept the Health Department's 
recommendations and to implement the Licensing Fee Standard. 
(R-71-72) One member of the Board opposed the motion and one 
abstained. (R-72) The Board then approved and signed Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which were very similar to 
those previously prepared by the Board's hearing officer. 
(Exhibit A) 
Following the adoption of the Licensing Fee Standard, 
the plaintiffs filed this action for declaratory judgment in 
Third District Court to determine the validity of the Licensing 
Fee Standard. Following oral argument on motions for summary 
judgment submitted by both parties. Honorable Third District 
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Court Judge Richard H. Moffat issued a minute entry on 
June 24, 1987, granting respondents1 motion for summary 
judgment and thereafter entered judgment in their favor on 
August 18, 1987. (R-161, R-191-197) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Board's arguments in this appeal may be summarized 
as follows: 
A. Section 26-24-14(14), U.C.A. (hereafter all 
statutory references are to Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended) 
authorizes the Board to "establish and collect appropriate 
fees...for public health purposes." The District Court's 
narrow interpretation to the effect that this section refers 
only to charging fees for minor items such as preparing copies 
and certificates is in error in six respects: 
1. The District Court's narrow interpretation of 
Section 26-24-14(14) directly contradicts a long line of Utah 
cases, including a recent Supreme Court case reviewing this 
very statute. Numerous Utah cases have established that 
licensing fees may be imposed so long as the fees will actually 
be used to defray the cost of the regulatory program. 
2. The Local Health Department Act itself 
authorizes the Board to charge and collect appropriate fees for 
public health purposes and does not limit the charging of fees 
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to only situations where services are provided to particular 
persons for their specific benefit, 
3. The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held 
that the power to make inspections carries with it the power to 
impose a fee to cover the costs of inspections. 
4. The power of the Board to license and inspect 
businesses and to establish and collect appropriate fees is a 
constitutionally permissible delegation of authority. 
5. The established rule of law in Utah is that a 
reviewing court should defer to the judgment and discretion of 
an authorized administrative body unless the body has violated 
clearly established law. 
6. The District Court's narrow holding does not 
make sense from a public policy rationale. Since state and 
local agencies all rely heavily on regulatory fees, strict 
application of the District Court holding would result in 
massive tax increases to compensate for the loss of fee 
revenues or the unraveling of essential regulatory programs 
throughout the state. 
B. The facts of this case clearly demonstrate that 
the licensing fee standard is a fee and not a tax. The fee 
meets the criteria articulated in the Utah Restaurant 
Association case in that the licensing fee standard is designed 
to defray some or all of the costs of inspecting food 
establishments, and there is some . assurance that the money 
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collected will be used to defray those costs. The Licensing 
Fee Standard is estimated to generate $156,000 and the cost of 
the program is $430,000, and all funds collected are credited 
to a special Health Department account, set aside exclusively 
for the Food Inspection Program, 
C. There is no statutory or common law requirement 
that the Board's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law must 
be substantially supported by evidence presented in a public 
hearing. The District Court failed to distinguish between 
legislative and adjudicatory functions, imposing a standard on 
the Board that is unreasonable in a rule-making setting. The 
Board complied with all statutory and common law procedural 
requirements. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING 
THAT THE BOARD DOES NOT HAVE 
STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO ENACT A 
COMPREHENSIVE FEE SCHEDULE TO 
REIMBURSE THE HEALTH DEPARTMENT FOR 
COSTS OF INSPECTING FOOD SERVICE 
ESTABLISHMENTS. 
Pursuant to Section 26-24-5, U.C.A., (1981) the Health 
Department is created and maintained by county and municipal 
governing bodies within Salt Lake County. The Health 
Department enforces state and local health laws, ordinances. 
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rules, and regulations [Section 26-24-14(2)], as well as rules, 
regulations, and standards adopted by the Board. [Section 
26-24-14(5)]. As authorized by state law, funding for the 
operation of the Health Department is provided through special 
levies, [Section 26-24-16(2)], appropriations from the Salt 
Lake County general fund, [Section 26-24-16(1)], and grants, 
fees, and donations, (Section 26-24-14(14)]. 
Consistent with the above funding mechanisms, the 
Health Department, like all other City-County Health 
Departments in Utah, (R-135), received, and has received for 
many years, substantial licensing fees from a number of 
regulatory programs. Licensing fees are primarily used by the 
Health Department to pay staff costs associated with inspecting 
and regulating businesses and industries which, due to public 
health risks, require a high level of monitoring and control. 
For example, the Health Department regulates and charges fees, 
in amounts similar to those contained in the Licensing Fee 
Standard, from the following individuals and business 
entities: asbestos removers, auto emissions testers, tanning 
salon and tatoo parlor operators, dairy and ice cream 
establishments, waste haulers, swimming pool operators, etc. 
(R-125) In this respect, the Health Department is no different 
than the State Health Department which charges fees for air 
quality and water pollution discharge permits, solid and 
hazardous waste disposal facility permits, asbestos removal 
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permits, underground storage tank permits, and various operator 
certification fees. Such fees by a local health department are 
authorized pursuant to Sections 26-24-14(14) and 26-24-18: 
A local health department shall have in 
addition to all other powers and duties 
imposed on it, the following powers and 
duties... 
(14) establish and collect appropriate 
fees, to accept, use and administer all 
federal, state, or private donations or 
grants of funds, property, services, or 
materials for public health purposes, 
and to make such agreements, not 
inconsistent with law, as may be 
required as a condition to receiving 
such donation or grant.... (emphasis 
added) 
* * * 
The treasurer of a health department 
shall, on organization of the 
department, create a health department 
fund to which shall be credited any 
moneys appropriated or otherwise made 
available by participating counties, 
cities, or other local political 
subdivisions and any moneys received 
from the state, federal government, or 
from surpluses, grants, fees or 
donations for local health purposes, 
(emphasis added.) 
The District Court in this case recognized that the 
Board has authority to charge fees, but interpreted Section 
26-24-14(14) very narrowly, ruling that this section 
...refers only to the charging of 
fees for such minor items as 
preparing certificates, copying 
fees, and similar fees for specific 
services to particular persons for 
their specific benefit•..[and] does 
not authorize defendant to attempt 
to offset substantial portions of 
its total costs, including, salaries 
and overhead involved in a 
particular program, through the 
imposition of such charges, (R-195) 
The impact of this narrow holding is enormous. Every 
city-county health department in this state receives 
substantial funds through license fees. (R-125) In 1986, the 
Salt Lake City-County Health Department alone received over one 
million dollars of its budget through regulation fees. (Id.) 
To rule that the Board lacks authority to enact licensing fees 
would likely lead to the elimination of vital health department 
inspection programs which are financed in part through 
inspection fees. The only alternative is massive tax 
increases, and the Utah Supreme Court is well aware of the 
practical hardships imposed when county government is required 
to rely solely on property taxes. See, e.g., the Mountain 
States Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Salt Lake County, 702 
P.2d 113 (J. Stewart dissenting). 
Aside from public policy justifications for continuing 
the practice of assessing regulatory fees for specific 
programs, such fees, as will be discussed in the remainder of 
this section, are supported by Utah common law, the plain 
language of the aforementioned state statutes, and traditional 
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rules of judicial restraint in reviewing administrative 
enactments, 
A. The Utah Supreme Court Has Long Recognized the 
Authority of Local Government Agencies to Charge Fees 
Proportionate to the Costs of Regulation, 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case, Utah Restaurant 
Assn. v. Davis County Board of Health, 709 P.2d 1159 (Ut. 
1985), reviewed a very similar restaurant fee schedule adopted 
by the Davis County Board of Health. The Court opined that in 
determining the validity of such regulatory licensing fees, the 
relevant factors to be considered are "whether the measure has 
been designed to actually defray some or all of the costs of 
inspecting the food establishments on which it is imposed" and 
whether "there is some assurance that the money collected will 
actually be used to defray those costs." Supra, at 1164. The 
Utah Supreme Court was not concerned about whether fees were to 
be used for salaries as opposed to minor copying costs or 
whether a particular individual rather from the public receives 
a specific benefit from the inspections. The Court's focus was 
on whether the money collected would be used to defray the 
actual costs of the regulatory program. 
The Davis County Board of Health case was not the 
first time that the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged the 
authority of a local government agency to enact licensing fees 
to defray costs of inspection and related costs. For example. 
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in Provo City v. Provo Meat and Packing Co., 165 P.2d 477 (Ut. 
1917)f the Utah Supreme Court upheld a municipal butcher shop 
licensing fee expressly adopted to pay for the costs of 
preparing licenses and performing inspections and supervisory 
duties. The Court ruled that "where the power is conferred to 
regulate a particular business or calling, the power to license 
is included with the power to regulate." Supra, at 479. The 
Court added that the license fee "may not exceed the reasonable 
cost of preparing and issuing the license and the reasonable 
expenses of inspections and supervision." Supra at 480. 
Since Provo Cityf the Utah Supreme Court has 
repeatedly recognized the ability of agencies who have 
authority to regulate a particular business to impose licensing 
fees to defray the cost of regulation. See, e.g., Murray City 
v. Board of Education of Murray City School District, 396 P.2d 
628 (Ut. 1964), (upheld imposition of sewer charge and 
connection fee); Lafferty v. Payson City, 642 P.2d 376 (Ut. 
1982) (recognized authority to assess reasonable permit fees); 
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Salt Lake 
County, 702 P.2d 113, 118 (Ut. 1985) (recognized county's 
authority to regulate the use of public roads and to charge 
reasonable fees to defray the cost of regulation). 
The only case supporting the District Court's position 
that the Board can only charge fees for non-regulatory items 
such as "preparing certificates and copying fees" is a district 
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court decision from Davis County which plaintiff attached to 
his Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. 
(R-101-107) However, as indicated in the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law attached as Exhibit E, the Davis County 
District Court reversed its decision following the Supreme 
Court's ruling on the same case. The fees upheld by the Davis 
County Court were of similar scope and magnitude as in this 
case. 
In light of the above rulings, this Court should view 
with considerable skepticism the Third District Court's 
position that fees can only be charged for specific services to 
particular persons for their specific benefit. Such a position 
requires an analysis of private versus public benefits, which 
is not required by statute or common law. However, even if it 
were necessary to prove private benefit, it is clear that 
restaurants receive a benefit from inspections in terms of 
accident avoidance and reduced liability exposure. Presumably, 
if the Health Department did not perform inspections, outside 
consultants would have to be hired to ensure compliance with 
Federal, State and local laws and regulations. 
B. The Power to Make Inspections by the Health 
Department Carries With it the Power to Impose a Fee to Cover 
the Costs of Inspections. 
The Health Department is clearly authorized under 
26-24-14 to make health inspections and to enforce rules, 
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regulations and standards adopted by the State. County, and 
Board. [Section 26-24-14(3). (5), (11); Section 26-24-8]. It 
is the rule in Utahf and generally among jurisdictions, that 
the right to inspect and to pass inspection ordinances carries 
with it the right to charge a fee to defray the cost of 
inspection. Salt Lake City v. Bennion Coal & Gas Co., 15 P.2d 
648 (Utah 1932); Provo City v, Provo Meat & Packing Co., supra 
at 479; 9 McQuillan Municipal Corporations, Section 18.27. 
In Salt Lake City v. Bennion Gas & Coal Co., supra. 
Salt Lake City brought an action against Bennion Gas & Oil 
Company to recover a judgment for an inspection fee which 
Bennion Gas & Coal Company failed to pay. Salt Lake City had 
earlier passed an ordinance which required the city to inspect 
gasoline and oil products sold by companies in Salt Lake City. 
The defendant complained that the power to inspect did not 
carry with it the power to charge for the inspection. The 
defendant also claimed that the inspection fee was a revenue 
measure and had no relationship whatsoever to the services 
rendered for the inspection. In response, the Supreme Court 
said at page 649: 
Respondent in the instant case has been 
granted direct power and express 
authority under section 570-45, supra, 
to pass inspection ordinances, and the 
law is that where such power has been 
given by the Legislature, the same 
carries with it as an incident thereto 
the right to charge a fee for said 
inspection. 
-16-
The Court in Bennion Gas and Coal thus concluded that 
the right to pass inspection ordinances carried with it the 
right to charge a fee to defray the cost of the inspection. 
The Court noted that since there was no showing that the 
inspection fee was not reasonably related to the expense 
incurred in making the inspection, there was no basis for 
ruling that the fee was excessive and unreasonable. 
The case at bar is stronger than the Bennion Gas & 
Coal case because the Local Health Department Act, Section 
26-24-14(14), specifically grants authority to the Board to 
impose fees. However, even absent a specific grant of 
authority to impose an inspection fee, there is, incident to 
the right of inspection, the power to impose a fee to offset 
the costs of the inspection. 
C. The Power to Establish and Collect Appropriate 
Fees is a Constitutionally Permissible Delegation of Authority 
to the Board. 
In the lower court proceeding, it was the respondents1 
position that the Board, as an administrative body, does not 
have legislative authority to enact the Licensing Fee 
Standard. (R-89) Assuming the district court accepted this 
argument in its ruling that the Board lacks statutory authority 
to impose regulatory licensing fees, it is the Board's 
contention that such a holding is inconsistent with the Utah 
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Supreme Court's earlier holdings recognizing the status and 
authority of administrative bodies. 
In State v. Goss, 11 P.2d 340 (Utah 1932), the Court 
stated the following: 
Boards and commissions now play an 
important part in the administration of 
our law. The great commercial and 
industrial evolution of the past 
century and the many demands upon our 
legislatures by the increasing 
complexity of human activities, have 
made essential the creation of these 
administrative bodies and the 
delegation to them of certain powers. 
Supra at page 341. 
* * * 
...it cannot be said that every grant 
of power to executive or administrative 
boards or officials, involving the 
exercise of discretion and judgment 
must be considered a delegation of 
legislative authority. While it is 
necessary that a law, when it comes 
from the law-making power, should be 
complete, still there are many matters 
relating to methods or details which 
may be by the legislature referred 
through some designated ministerial 
officer or body. All such matters fall 
within the domain of the right of the 
legislature to authorize an 
administrative board or body to adopt 
ordinance, rules, by-laws, or 
regulations in aid of the successful 
execution of some general statutory 
provision. Supra at 342. 
The Board's enactment of the Licensing Fee Standard is 
an appropriate delegation, consistent with the holding in 
Goss. The Board is authorized by The Local Health Department 
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Act to impose appropriate fees and make rules and regulations 
to carry out the law. In addition, safeguards are provided to 
the effect that if any fees or rules or regulations are not 
appropriate, any person aggrieved by any action or inaction of 
the Board of Health may seek review through the courts. 
[Section 26-24-19(4)] Moreover, the Health Department is 
monitored by the State Health Department and made subject to 
state performance standards and regulations. (Section 26-24-3). 
In recent years, decisions of the Utah Supreme Court 
have favored strengthening the role of administrative bodies. 
In Ricker v. Board of Education of Millard County School 
District, 396 P.2d 416 (Utah 1964), the court upheld the Board 
of Education's position that it should have a free hand in 
using funds where the Board felt the most pressing needs were. 
The Court declared at page 520: 
It is the policy of the law not to 
favor limitations on the powers of the 
administrative body, but rather to give 
it a free hand to function within the 
sphere of its responsibilities. 
Of similar importance is Lloyd A. Fry Co. v. Utah Air 
Conservation Committee, 545 P.2d 495 (Utah 1975). There an 
attack was made by plaintiff against the constitutionality of 
the Air Conservation Act. One argument made by plaintiff was 
that the Act constituted an improper delegation of legislative 
power to the Air Conservation Committee because there were 
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insufficient standards to guide the committee. In upholding 
the legislative delegation of authority to the Air Conservation 
Committee, the Supreme Court said at page 500: 
In Bortz Coal Company v. Air Pollution 
Commission, the court, in ruling that 
the Pennsylvania Air Pollution Control 
Act did not constitute an unlawful 
delegation of authority observed that 
if the regulatory agency sets forth 
unreasonable standards of air 
pollution, the citizens are protected 
through the appeal provisions of the 
act. This concept is an accord with 
the view expressed by Davis, 
Administrative Law Treatise; Section 
2.09, page 113, that the law of 
delegation would be strengthened if the 
courts were to de-emphasize statutory 
standards and to emphasize the degree 
of procedural safeguards. 
Applying the principles set forth in the above cases 
to the facts of the present case, it is clear that there is 
ample protection to any aggrieved person if the Board should 
impose an unreasonable, arbitrary or inappropriate fee. In 
addition, the power to establish and collect appropriate fees 
is part of the overall expressed legislative purpose of the 
Local Health Department Act. The legislative delegation of 
authority to the Board to establish and collect appropriate 
fees is therefore proper and should be upheld by this Court. 
D. The Board Should be Given Wide Latitude of 
Discretion and its Decisions Should be Presumed to be Valid. 
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The Board is an independent administrative body 
consisting of members from the community who have interest or 
training pertaining to the health needs of the community. The 
Utah Supreme Court has on numerous occasions set forth the 
standard of review for such administrative bodies: 
The universally recognized role of 
actions of administrative agencies 
requires this court to take some 
cognizance of the expertise of the 
agency in its particular field and 
accordingly to give some deference to 
its determination and not to upset the 
decision unless it appears that the 
action of the commission is so in error 
or so unfair or unreasonable, that it 
must be regarded as arbitrary...Utah 
Power & Light Company v. Utah Tax 
Commission, 590 P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 
1979). 
The general deference to the action of local 
government and administrative bodies is well expressed in 9 
McQuillan Municipal Corporations, Section 18.27: 
In other words, considerable latitude 
in the exercise of discretionary power 
must be left to the municipal 
authorities. Their action within the 
limits of their power must be very 
clearly shown to be unreasonable before 
it be nullified before the courts. 
When general power to enact the 
ordinance in question exists, its mere 
passage makes that a prima facia case 
for its reasonableness. When the 
courts are called upon to exercise the 
judicial power in declaring an 
ordinance unreasonable, they will make 
such a declaration only when the prima 
facia case made by the passage of the 
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ordinance is overcome in the most 
satisfactory manner. 
Referring to a city's taxing authority, the Utah 
Supreme Court ruled that: 
Where neither the constitution nor the 
statute imposes absolute restrictions, 
the courts may not arbitrarily impose 
any unless it clearly appears that the 
tax imposed is oppressive or clearly 
unreasonably discriminatory, and, thus, 
is an abuse of the (tax paying) power. 
Salt Lake City v. Christensen Co., 9 5 
P. 523 (Utah 1908). (Accord: Banberry 
Development Corp. v. So. Jordan City, 
631 P.2d 899. 904 (Utah 1981); Call v. 
City of West Jordan, Utah, 614 P.2d 
1257 (Utah 1980). 
There is absolutely no basis in the record to support 
the conclusion that the Licensing Fee Standard is unreasonable 
or in violation of the law, or that the Board acted arbitrarily 
or capriciously. That the Licensing Fee Standard was intended 
to pay for inspectors' salaries does not establish a prima 
facia case, as the District Court supposed, that the standard 
is unreasonable or in violation of state or constitutional 
law. Absent such a showing, it was error for the District 
Court to substitute its judgment for that of the Board. 
POINT II. 
THE LICENSING FEE STANDARD IMPOSED BY 
THE BOARD IS A FEE AND NOT A TAX. 
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The District Court in this case recognized that the 
Board may legitimately enact fees to defray certain costs; 
however, the Court felt that the Licensing Fee Standard was not 
a fee but a tax. Contrary to the District Court's position, 
the Board contends that funds collected pursuant to the 
Licensing Fee Standard, which are used for no other purpose but 
to inspect and regulate food establishments, are, according to 
Utah law, fees rather than taxes. 
As indicated in the Utah Restaurant Association case, 
the relevant factors to be considered in determining whether a 
fee schedule amounts to a tax are "whether the measures have 
been designed to defray some or all of the costs of inspecting 
a food establishment on which it is imposed11 and whether "there 
is some assurance that the money collected will be used to 
defray those costs." Supra at 1164. The criteria set forth in 
Utah Restaurant Association for distinguishing taxes from fees 
have long been applied in Utah. See, e.g., Best Foods Inc. , 
v. Christensen, 285 P 1001 (Utah 1930); Smith v. Carbon County, 
63 P.2d 259, 262 (Utah 1936); Weber Basin Home Builder's 
Association v. Roy, 487 P.2d 866 (Utah 1971); Lafferty v. 
Payson City, 642 P.2d 376, 378 (Utah 1982). 
In Best Foods, the plaintiff brought suit against the 
defendant, the Utah State Treasurer, claiming that a Utah 
statute requiring manufacturers and retailers of margarine to 
pay an inspection fee or an annual license was invalid because 
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it constituted a tax. The plaintiff contended that there was a 
fundamental distinction between a license fee imposed under the 
police power and a license fee imposed for revenue. The court 
noted that a license tax upon the inhabitants of the city 
enacted for the sole purpose of raising revenue for the city 
was improper. The court, however, declared: 
On the other hand, it is well settled 
that a law which was enacted to protect 
a public interest or defend against a 
public wrong is not a tax. although it 
requires the payment of a license fee 
to bear the expense of carrying out its 
provisions. Supra at 1004 
Since the purpose of the fee in the Best Foods case 
was to assist in offsetting the cost of the service rendered, 
the Court upheld the imposition of the license fee. By 
applying the principles set forth in Best Foods. Utah 
Restaurant Association, and the many other Utah cases with 
holdings similar to the uncontested facts presented to the 
lower court, there can be no question that the inspection fee 
imposed by appellant is a fee. 
First, it is undisputed that the fee will produce 
revenues in an amount less than the expenses of inspection and 
supervision. As indicated in paragraph 7 of the Board's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, attached as Exhibit A. 
the actual cost of the food inspection program in Salt Lake 
County. less food handler permit fees, was estimated at 
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$430,000. As also indicated in Exhibit A, the Board determined 
that the fee schedule would generate approximately $156,000. 
Thus, since the estimated revenues are $156,000 and the cost of 
the program is $430,000, it is clear that the fee schedule 
would raise funds to pay for only one-third of the costs of the 
food inspection program and would not raise surpluses 
sufficient to fund other County programs. 
Second, it is clear that the money collected will 
actually be used to defray the costs of the Food Inspection 
Program. As indicated in the Stipulated Facts, (R-49), funds 
collected pursuant to the fee schedule have been accounted for 
separately and have been set aside exclusively for the Food 
Inspection Program. As further indicated in Auditor Nelson 
William's affidavit, the licensing fee standard funds will not 
be appropriated or lapse into County general funds during the 
pendency of this appeal, but, depending upon the outcome of 
this appeal, shall either be refunded or used to pay for a 
portion of the County's costs incurred in conducting the Food 
Inspection Program. By state law, monies appropriated to the 
Health Department Fund, can be "expended only for maintenance 
and operation of the local health department," and cannot be 
used to finance other County programs. (Section 26-24-18) 
Based on the foregoing, it should be evident that the fees will 
be used only to pay for the Food Inspection Program. 
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POINT III. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT 
THE BOARD'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW MUST BE 
SUBSTANTIALLY SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE 
PRESENTED IN A PUBLIC HEARING. 
Section 26-24-20, reproduced in its entirety in 
Exhibit B, sets forth the procedures that a board of health 
must follow in promulgating rules, regulations or standards. 
In summary. Section 26-24-20 provides that a board of health 
must publish notice, provide for a public hearing, and prepare 
and file a summary of the proceeding together with findings of 
fact and conclusions of law and the order of the board of 
health. 
The Board complied in all respects with the above 
procedural reguireraents. The Board timely published notice of 
the fee standard in the Salt Lake Tribune and the Deseret News, 
(R-73), held a public hearing before a Board-appointed hearing 
officer, (R-60), even held a second public hearing before the 
Board itself, (R-66), prepared a summary of the proceedings, 
(R-60), and filed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
Exhibit A). 
The District Court in this case was not satisfied with 
the above procedures followed by the Board, but reguired in 
addition to holding a public hearing, that the Board make an 
evidentiary presentation in support of the standard at the 
public hearing. Although the District Court in its Conclusions 
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of Law stated that such a showing is required under Section 
26-24-1, et seq., (R-195), the petitioner is unable to find any 
language in the Local Health Department Act requiring such a 
showing. Moreover, the requirement for such a showing in an 
administrative rule-making proceeding is not established by 
Utah common law. Rather, it is well established that 
administrative regulations that are reasonably consistent with 
statutory requirements are presumed to be valid, and, absent 
some otherwise compelling ground, should be upheld. The State, 
by and through the Department of Community Affairs v. Utah 
Merit System Council, 614 P.2d 1259 (Utah 1980); Hi-Star, Inc., 
v. Washington State Liquor Control Board, 722 P.2d (Wash. 
1986); 9 McQuillan, Municipal Corporation, §26.09. 
The Board believes that much of the confusion in this 
case stems from the District Court's failure to recognize the 
distinction between legislative functions and adjudicatory or 
enforcement functions. As recognized by the Utah Supreme Court 
in Utah Restaurant Association, supra at 1164, the requirements 
for a rule-making proceeding are substantially different from 
those in an adjudicatory proceeding. The Supreme Court 
required Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Utah 
Restaurant Association merely because the statute requires the 
filing of such a document. However, the Supreme Court had 
difficulty understanding why the preparation of such a document 
is necessary in a rule-making setting: 
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One would not expect when promulgating 
a rulef an agency would have to prepare 
findings of fact and conclusions of 
law: such a requirement is normally 
associated with the adjudication of a 
claim. However, the language of this 
section is clear even if its purpose is 
not. Supra at 1184. 
Based on the above statement, it is reasonable to 
conclude that if the statute had not required preparation of 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Supreme Court 
would not have required the filing of the same. Likewise, 
where the statute does not require a full evidentiary hearing 
in which the burden is placed on the Board to justify the 
standard, the District Court should not have required such a 
procedure. No Utah cases have been found which require such a 
showing in an administrative rule-making setting. 
If a supporting public hearing as extensive as the 
District Court suggested were required whenever a governing 
body enacts a law or regulation, many of the laws and 
regulations enacted by the Utah Legislature, county 
commissions, and municipal councils throughout the state would 
be subject to attack. Obviously, public officials rely heavily 
on their own intuition and recommendations of staff members 
when making a decision to adopt a law or regulation and such is 
not always reflected in a public hearing. It is not the law in 
Utah that every element contained in a legislative package must 
be documented and supported in a public hearing. Rather, there 
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is a presumption of constitutionality attached to an agency's 
exercise of rule-making authority. 
In Central Bank and Trust Co. v. Brimhall, 497 P.2d 
638 (Utah 1972)f the Supreme Court reviewed a trial court's 
determination to set aside a bank commissioner's grant of 
charter to establish a bank. The Court opined: 
In the field of administrative law. the 
assumption is indulged that the 
administrator (or administrative 
tribunal) possesses superior knowledge 
and expertise because of specialized 
training and experience and a focus of 
interest within the particular field. 
For this reason, the well established 
rule is that the courts indulge in 
considerable latitude in the 
determinations he makes in questions of 
fact and also in the exercise of his 
discretion with respect to the 
responsibilities which the law imposes 
upon him; they will not interfere 
therewith unless it appears that he 
acted in excess of his powers or that 
he so abused his discretion that his 
action was capricious or arbitrary. 
Supra at 641. 
Obviously, the purpose of the public hearing prior to 
the adoption of a standard is to provide the public with an 
opportunity to address its concerns to the Board. Since the 
Board is the entity which determines whether or not to adopt 
the Licensing Fee Standard, it is unreasonable to require the 
Board to make a presentation to itself of all the reasons for 
or against adopting the standard. The Board itself is composed 
of experienced and knowledgeable professionals from the 
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community who may properly rely on their own judgment and past 
experience. See., e.g., Utah Power & Light v. Utah Tax 
Commission, 590 P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1979); Cottonwood Heights 
Citizen's Association v. Board of Salt Lake County 
Commissioners, 593 P.2d 138, 140 (Utah 1979). Board members 
have adopted numerous fee schedules in the past, and it may be 
unnecessary for them to seek public discussion on revenue 
flows, accounting procedures, etc., which they may already be 
well aware and which have been summarized for them by Health 
Department staff. Nevertheless, if public participants desired 
to comment on these issues, they were free to do so. 
As indicated in the Health Department staff comments, 
presented to the District Court and attached as Exhibit E, the 
Health Department took the comments at the public hearing 
seriously and responded to each of the areas addressed by the 
participants in the public hearing. The public was never 
denied the right to ask guestions or provide input at the 
hearings. The fact that the Board made a decision contrary to 
the majority of the public participants at the hearing does not 
imply that the Board acted arbitrarily or unreasonably or that 
public comment was ignored. 
In view of the Board's scrupulous compliance with the 
Local Mental Health Act, there is no procedural basis for 
overturning the fee standard. The District Court improperly 
placed the burden of establishing reasonableness on the Board 
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and looked only at the two public hearings for evidence in 
support of the Licensing Fee Standard. Recognizing the 
presumption of reasonableness and constitutionality incident to 
the exercise of the Board's rule-making powers and the 
traditional unwillingness of Utah courts to impose additional 
procedural requirements on rule-making bodies, it is urged that 
this Court reverse the District Court's determination to add 
unnecessary and burdensome procedures to an already complex 
rule-making process. 
CONCLUSION 
The Board respectfully submits that it acted with 
lawful authority, consistent with required procedures, in 
adopting the Licensing Fee Standard. The Board did not present 
evidence in support of the Licensing Fee Standard at the public 
hearing because the Board was not functioning in an adversarial 
role and it had no reason, legal or otherwise, to make an 
evidentiary presentation. The Board scheduled the public 
hearing for the purpose of giving the public an opportunity to 
voice its concerns and to provide input into the Board's 
ultimate decision on whether to adopt, review, or reject the 
proposed standard. 
The Board has justifiably relied on the long-
established rule in Utah that regulatory licensing fees, 
adopted and maintained to defray the costs of a specific 
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regulatory program, are lawful. The District Court's rejection 
of this time-honored precedent is unsupported by compelling 
policy grounds. Rather, application of the District Court's 
ruling will create havoc among local government agencies trying 
to replace regulatory fees with other revenues. 
Based upon the foregoing. appellant respectfully 
submits that this Court should reverse the judgment of the 
lower court. 
DATED this 2^-day of November. 1987. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
By: 
(jp/201+) 
THOMAS L. CHRISTENSEN 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorney for Salt Lake 
County Defendant-
Appellant 
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EXHIBIT Z 
(R-73-74) 
SALT LAKE CITY-COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT 
FOOD SERVICE/FOOD ESTABLISHMENT 
LICENSING FEE STANDARDS 
FINDING OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Salt Lake City-County Health Department carries out responsibilities 
of food inspection in Salt Lake County. This authority is granted to 
the Salt Lake City-County Health Department by the Local Health Department 
Act of the Utah Code Annotated Title 26, Chapter 24. 
2. Section 26-24-14(14) allows local health departments to charge fees to 
carry out its responsibility. 
3. On September 10, 1986, a public hearing was held in order to receive 
public comment regarding the fees. Notice of the public hearing was 
advertised August 10 and 23, 1986, in the Salt Lake Tribune and Deseret 
News at'least 15 days prior to the public hearing. 
4. A summary of comments received at the public hearing was presented to 
the Board of Health at its regular scheduled Board of Health Meeting on 
October 2, 1986. 
5. While objection was raised by several individuals-as to the charging 
of the fees, no information was brought forward which demonstrated that 
the proposed fees standard was contrary to state or local laws, was 
excessive, or not tied directly to the cost of the inspection program 
and to be used to support this cost. 
6. The Board finds that the proposed Food Inspection Fee Standard is 
consistent with the charging of fees in other Salt Lake City-County Health 
Department regulations such as the Asbestos Regulation, Massage Parlor 
Regulations, Swimming Pool Regulations, etc., and that the proposed fee 
does not single out food establishments in the charging of fees. 
7. The actual cost of the Food Inspection Program at the Salt Lake City-County 
Health Department is $453,000. Current fees for food handler permits total 
$25,000. Cost of the Food Inspection Program not covered by current fees 
totals $430,000. 
8. The proposed fee schedule will generate approximately $156,000, which is 
approximately one-third the total cost of the Food Inspection Program. 
9. Money collected by the proposed fee will be deposited in an account of 
the Health fund set up specifically to receive monies generated by the 
proposed standard. 
10. Funding to support the Food Inspection Program will be drawn from the 
account mentioned above in Item #9. 
-2-
The Salt Lake City-County Board of Health, therefore, concludes that 
the proposed food fees are reasonable and consistent with other fees 
charged by the Department, that proper procedures have been followed in 
developing the fees pursuant to Section 26-24-20, that the proposed fees 
will be used to support the Food Inspection Program, and that the fees are 
legal and meet the intent of Section 26-24-14. Therefore, the Board adopts 
the fees standard as attached this 2nd day of October , 1986. 
ry -
L. JecTTTonM'son, M.D., Chairman 
Sa l t Lake City-County Board of Health 
EXHIBIT B 
26-24-20. Regulations adopted by local board - procedure -
Administrative and judicial review of actions, 
(1) The board may adopt rules, regulations, and 
standards, not in conflict with rules of the department, 
necessary for the promotion of public health, environmental 
health quality, injury control and the prevention of outbreaks 
and spread of communicable and infectious diseases, that shall 
have the affect of law. Such rules, regulations and standards 
when adopted shall supersede existing local rules, regulations, 
standards and ordinances pertaining to similar subject matter. 
(2) The board shall provide public hearings prior to 
the adoption of any rule, regulation or standard. Notice of 
any such public hearing shall be published at least twice in a 
newspaper of general circulation in the area within the 
jurisdiction of the local health department. 
(3) the hearings may be conducted by the board at a 
regular or special meeting, or the board may appoint hearing 
officers, who shall have power and authority to conduct 
hearings in the name of the board at a designated time and 
place. A record or summary of the proceedings of any hearing 
shall be taken and filed with the board, together with findings 
of fact, conclusions of law, and the order of the board or 
hearing officer. In any hearing, a member of the board or the 
hearing officer shall have power to administer oaths, examine 
witnesses, and issue notice of the hearings or subpoenas in the 
name of the board requiring the testimony of witnesses and the 
production of evidence relevant to any matter in the hearing. 
(4) Any person aggrieved by any action or inaction of 
the local health department shall have an opportunity for an 
informal hearing with the health officer or a designated 
representative of the local health department. Further 
hearings before the board shall be granted upon the request in 
writing. 
(5) Judicial review of a final determination of the 
local board may be secured by any person adversely affected 
thereby, or by the department, by filing a petition in the 
district court within 30 days after receipt of notice of the 
board's final determination. The petition, which shall be 
served upon a member of the board, shall state the grounds upon 
APPENDIX B, (page two) 
which review is sought. the board, in its answer, shall 
certify the file with the court all documents and papers and a 
transcript of all testimony taken in the matter, together with 
its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order. The 
appellant and the board shall be parties to the appeal. The 
department may become a party by intervention as in a civil 
action upon showing cause therefor. 
(6) A further appeal may be taken to the supreme court. 
(JP7+) 
EXHIBIT y. 
POOD SERVICE/FOOD ESTABLISHMENT 
LICENSING FEE STANDARDS 
This Standard is adopted this day 
of , 1986, by the Salt Lake City-County 
Board of Health, a local board of health organized pursuant 
to Section 26-24-9, U.C.A. (1953). 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
WHEREAS , it has become necessary to establish a 
fee schedule .for food/food service establishments in Salt Lake 
County to pay a portion of Salt Lake City-County Health Depart-
ment's reasonable expenses of inspecting and enforcing 
State and local food rules and regulations : and 
WHEREAS, the Salt Lake City-County • Health Department 
is authorized to adopt this standard pursuant to Section 
26-24-14 (14) U.C.A. (1953), and Salt Lake City-County Health 
Department Regulation No. 4 and No. 5, and No. 6, Food 
Service Establishments and Food Establishments, Sections 4.2. 
NCW, THEREFORE, The Salt Lake City-County Board of 
Health ordains as follows : 
Section I. Definitions: 
Food Service Establishments - Restaurants, restaurants/clubs, 
restaurants/fast food, cafeterias, 
snack bars/fountains, nursing 
hemes, day care centers, bars, 
lounges, ice cream stores, 
or 
Food Establishments -
any pxace wnere rood is prepared and 
intended for individual portion 
service, whether the consunption is 
on or off the premises or there is 
a charge for the food. This does not 
include private hones where food is 
prepared or served for individual 
family consunption. 
Grocery stores, bakeries, candy 
factories, bottling plants, convenience 
stores, canning factories, meat 
processing plants, cold storage ware-
houses, food storage warehouses, or 
similar establishments where food pro-
ducts are manufactured, canned, packed, 
processed, stored, transported, prepared, 
sold, or offered for sale. 
Temporary Food Service 
Establishments -
Service Bays -
Seats -
Food Service establishments that oper-
ate at a fixed location for not more than 
14 consecutive days in conjunction with 
a single event or celebration. 
Include, but are not limited to, cash 
register stands, drive-up windows, walk-
up windows, and/or different points from 
which food is dispensed or served to the 
public. Waited tables are not considered 
service bays. 
Seating that is available for the 
public within a food service establishment. 
The number of seats shall be determined 
by the listing on the business license 
application or by physical count by the 
regulatory authority. 
Banquet seating, not used for everyday 
seating, shall not be included in the 
total number of seats. The number of 
beds, in lieu of the number of seats, 
may be used to classify hospitals and 
correctional institutions. 
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Square Footage - Square footage will be determined 
on the basis of the outside wall 
measurements of the food establishment. 
Section II. Annual Fees. All food service/food establishments 
in Salt Lake County shall be classified according to the following 
criteria into one of six (6) categories for the purpose of 
assessing annual fees: 
Category I $40.00 Day Care centers, nursing hemes and food 
service/food establishments providing 
either one service bay or zero to ten 
seats. 
Category II 
Category III 
Category IV 
$60.00 
$80.00 
$100.00 
Category V (a) $40.00 
(b) $60.00 
(c) $80.00 
(d) $100.00 
Food service/food establishments pro-
viding either two service bays or 
eleven to fifty seats. 
Food service/food establishments pro-
viding either three service bays 
or fifty-one to seventy-five seats. 
Food service/food establishments pro-
viding either four or more 
service bays or seventy-six or 
more seats. 
Food establishments with under 
2,000 square feet. 
2,000 to 3,000 square feet. 
3,000 to 5,000 square feet. 
5,000 square feet or more. 
Category VI $10.00 flat 
+ $5.00 per 
day (not to 
exceed $35 total) 
Temporary food service establish-
ments operating fourteen days or 
less. 
Section III. General Provisions; 
1. All fees shall be paid annually and are due 
in advance on the 1st day * of January of each year, 
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pjtuviaea, nowever, x^ iai: wnen a Dusiness license application is made 
after the 1st day of July, except under Category VI, the fee for 
the fixst year shall be at the rate of 50 per cent (50%) of the 
annual fee. No fees, or any part thereof, may be refunded or 
transferred. 
2. The Salt Lake City-County Health Department shall 
attempt to notify each food establishment/food service estab-
lishment prior to the date on which fees are due of its deter-
mination of category assignment, and the amount of fees 
due. Fees unpaid after forty-five (45) days of the due date 
will be assessed a penalty of twenty-five per cent (25%) of the 
amount of such fees which shall be added to the original amount. 
Failure to pay annual fees and additional charges after ninety 
(90) days of the due date may result in revocation or suspension 
of food/food service permits and the right to operate. A twenty-
five per cent (25%) charge will be assessed for each returned check. 
3. Consistent with Health Department Regulations No. 4, 
Section 4.2, and No. 5, Section 4.2, and No. 6, Section 4.2, the 
Salt Lake City-County Health Department shall provide notice and 
opportunity for a hearing to consider or reconsider the revocation 
or suspension of the right to operate due to nonpayment of fees. 
4. In determining food establishment/food service 
establishment categories, the Salt Lake City-GsmtY Health Depart-
ment may classify hospitals, correctional facilities, and other 
institutions by seats, beds, or other reasonable criteria. 
Day care centers and nursing hones will be classified as Category 
I. Food establishments that have multiple units under one roof 
will be classified by square footage. 
-4-
of this standard or the application thereof shall be held to 
be invalid, such invalidity shall not affect the other provisions 
or applications of this standard. The valid part of any 
clause, sentencef or paragraph of this standard shall be given 
independence frcm the invalid provisions or application and to 
this end the provisions of this standard is declared to be 
severable. 
Section IV. This Standard shall become effective 
fifteen (15) days after its passage. 
APPROVED and ADOPTED on the day and year first above 
vnritten. 
SALT LAKE CITY-COUNTY BOARD OF HEALTH 
By: 
Chairman 
Voting 
Voting 
Voting 
(0887J) 
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EXHIBIT D 
(R-162-165) 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Acting Salt Lake County Attorney 
By: THOMAS L. CHRISTENSEN (4295) 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorney for Defendant 
Salt Lake City-County Health 
Department 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION, 
a Utah non-profit corporation, 
UTAH RETAH, GROCERS ASSOCIA-
TION, a Utah non-profit 
corporation, UTAH HOTEL-MOTEL 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah non-
profit corporation. LAMB'S 
RESTAURANT. FLYING "J". UTAH 
FOOD & CATERING. INC., DEES 
FAMILY RESTAURANTS. KENTUCKY 
FRIED CHICKEN-HARMON'S 
MANAGEMENT CORP., GASTRONOMY. 
INC.. TACO MAKER, INC.. 
MARKET STREET GRILL. MARKET 
STREET BROILER. NEW YORKER 
RESTAURANT, HILTON HOTELS-
PEARSON ENTERPRISES. 
SIZZLING PLATTER. INC.. 
STAN'S MARKET. N.P.S.. 
CRYSTAL PALACE MARKET, 
WHEEL-IN MARKET, THE 
TABLE SUPPLY. VOYLES 
MARKET, THE STORE. 
ALBERTSON'S INC., FAMILY 
MARKET. SAFEWAY STORES. INC.. 
THE TANNING EXPERIENCE. O.P. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
NELSON G. WILLIAMS 
Civil No. C86-9024 
Honorable Judge Moffat 
SKAGGS #1, SAB ENTERPRISES. 
8TH AVE. MEAT AND GROCERY. 
MACEY'S, INC.. BELL'S 48TH 
ST. MARKET, PETERSON 
FOODTOWN, FOOD-4-LESS, DAN'S 
FOODS, MONTIE'S BESTWAY, and 
HALE'S MARKET, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
SALT LAKE CITY-COUNTY BOARD 
OF HEALTH. 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss: 
County of Salt Lake) 
NELSON G. WILLIAMS, being first duly sworn upon his 
oath, deposes and says: 
1. That I am presently employed as a Deputy County 
Auditor of Salt Lake County and serve as Director of the 
Division of Management and Budget in the Office of the Salt 
Lake County Auditor. 
2. That money collected to date pursuant to the "Food 
Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee Standard" (hereafter, 
"fee standard"), has not been expended for any purpose pending 
resolution of this action. 
3. That said fee standard funds have been deposited 
with the County Treasurer's Office and have been credited to a 
Health Department balance sheet account which reflects only 
revenues received from the fee standard. 
4. That money collected from the fee standard cannot 
be used for general revenue purposes but must be 
-2-
appropriated to cover only the costs of regulating food 
service/food establishments. 
5. That my review of the Salt Lake City-County Health 
Department's 1987 cost and revenue projections for the food 
inspection program indicates the cost of the food inspection 
program exceeds total revenues derived from inspection fees. 
DATED this 2? 
s« 
day of May, 1987, 
^/ CC^&^'J^ - H/^^^-^ 
. 1 ^ 
NELSON G. WILLIAMS 
SUBCRIBED and SWORN to before me this 
. 1987. 
day 
MKJ 
(SEAL) 
My Commission Expires: 
NOIJARY PUBL'IC. r e s i d i n g in 
SaK Latfd County, s t a t e of Utah 
4-IUJ& 
- 3 -
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct co 
of the foregoing to the following, postage prepaid this 
day of May, 1987. 
Gary E. Atkin 
Attorney at Law 
185 South State Street #400 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
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EXHIBIT _JL 
(R-75-79) 
STAFF RESPONSE TO COMMENTS AT THE PUBLIC HEARING HELD 
SEPTEMBER 10, 1986 
This paper combines and summarizes the comments made at the 
hearing related to the proposed food service inspection fees and 
gives the response of the Health Department staff to these comments: 
COMMENT: 
STAFF RESPONSE: 
COMMENT: 
STAFF RESPONSEJ 
The food service industry is barely making a profit. 
This fee will cause a detrimental effect on profits and 
a loss of business and jobs. 
The staff was reasonable in the amounts proposed for the 
fee standard. The maximum amount to be charged is 
$100.00 per year for Category IV or Category V establish-
ments , which have 7 6 or more seats or 5,000 or more 
square feet of floor space. At the most, this amount 
figures to be $1.32 per seat or two cents a square foot. 
To be even more realistic, we estimate that the annual 
fee would cost a fraction of one cent per meal served. 
At the rates proposed, we believe the fee will not be 
a significant detriment in lost profits, business or 
jobs. 
The purpose of the inspection is to protect the public; 
therefore, the burden of cost should be born by the 
public and the general tax. Tax increases should come 
from the regular budget process. 
It is true the purpose of the food service inspection 
is to protect the public but in this case, as it is in 
many other cases, it is not the general public that is 
causing the threat of foodborne illness. The "public" 
creating the potential problem should carry primary 
responsibility to prevent it. We believe, however, sup-
port for the fee will ultimately come from the general 
public or customers of food establishments as the cost 
is passed on to them through the meals or food purchased, 
As James V. Olsen, President of that Utah Retail Grocers 
Association, stated in his hearing comments, "...the 
businesses are forced to pass on these costs of doing 
business to their customers through higher prices". The 
cost that will be passed on will be minute. 
If it was the intent of the Utah State Legislature thru 
the Local Health Department Act Section 26-24-16 that 
only general tax dollars be the source of funding for 
local health departments, it appears they are creating 
a contradiction in Section 26-24-14(14). If Section 
26-24-14(14) was intended only for the establishment of 
fees where a direct benefit is received (e.g., fee for 
a birth certificate), it does not so state, and, if the 
legislature decides to clarify this law and limit fees 
only to direct benefit, it will make it necessary for 
local health departments to shift the source jaf funding 
to the property tax. If this shift causes an increase 
in property tax, the public would be opposed, even more 
so than the imposition of a fee. 
An editorial in the Salt Lake Tribune reflects the 
staff's point of view and we believe the point of view 
of the public. A copy is attached. 
All efforts to obtain a budget increase through the 
regular budget process have been exhausted, although we 
never dismiss this alternative in evaluating our pro-
grams . The County Commission feels they have received 
a clear public mandate that property taxes not be raised* 
DMMENT: A special group of businesses have been singled out, are 
required to be inspected and then are charged for the 
inspection. 
?AFF RESPONSE: The current philosophy and intent of the County Com-
mission, where possible, is to have each program support 
itself* The trend not only in Salt Lake County and Utah, 
but nationwide is to have fees support each program and 
have these programs supported either by those being regu-
lated or those using the service. In establishing this 
basis, the food service industry is not being singled 
out* Permit or inspection fees have already been estab-
lished within the department for asbestos control, mas-
sage establishments, barber and beauty shops, swimming 
pools, solid waste haulers and facilities, septic tank 
inspections, and tattoo establishments. There is a fee 
schedule in the tanning facility regulations which is 
now going through the public comment process. Consis-
tency from the public point of view and the point of view 
of those already charged for a fee would dictate that 
the food industry should also assume part of the cost. 
MMENT: Rather than impose a fee, the department should increase 
efficiency, be creative in effectiveness and tighten its 
belt. 
AFF RESPONSE: The department has always and will continue to seek and 
adopt efficiencies prior to seeking budget increases. 
The department's reputation is clear that its budget sub-
mitted each year is a "bare bones'* budget. In 1970, Salt 
Lake County's population was 480,152. In 1986, it has 
increased to over 700,000. Food establishments have 
increased 5-8% per year and now totals 3,000. The 
National Environmental Health Association recommends an 
average workload of 150 food establishments per sani-
tarian. Our workload is 250. 
With this remarkable increase in workload, the Food Pro-
tection Program has not had an increase in staff in the 
past 10 years- Rather, the excellence of the-program 
has been maintained through efficiencies and creative 
management. A number of efficiencies were created with 
the computerized "SPIF" (Sanitation Program Information 
Formulator) Program. This program provides timely and 
meaningful data for each sanitarian. Food establishments 
that receive a low score receive greater attention and 
more frequent inspections, data is easily collected, 
tabulated and reported, inspection patterns and scores 
are readily available, and time sequences for reinspec-
tions are determined. Other efforts to "tighten our 
belt" have included cutting the inspection program for 
preschools and nursing homes and not picking up inspec-
tions of group homes, hourly day care facilities, 
extended care facilities and halfway houses. 
As an alternative to the department training all food 
handlers, a food establishment has the option of having 
its manager trained and the manager, in turn, training 
his employees. Unfortunately, few food establishments 
have implemented their own training program. 
Other agencies, both in and out of county government, 
have reviewed the department and its individual programs. 
Those reviews may be summed up in a statement in a March, 
1986, report by the Utah Foundation. It states, "Expen-
ditures of the Salt Lake City-County Health Division in 
1984 appear significantly less than expenditures of 1974, 
if the 1974 figures are adjusted for inflation and the 
increased number of people served. Over the same period, 
health services appear to have approximately doubled.". 
COMMENT: The fee is an unfair tax and tax increase. The food 
industry already pays taxes, license fees, and food 
handler permits to support the Food Protection budget. 
STAFF RESPONSE: The inspection fee is not a tax and it is not unfair or 
hidden. Authority to establish the fee is based on 
Section 26-24-14(14) of the Utah Code Annotated (Local 
Health Department Act). An individual often does not 
know what is included in his tax statement, where the 
taxes are going and how they are being spent. The food 
inspection fee on the other hand is a specific amount, 
the payer of the fee knows what it is for and should see 
a direct result. The fee is earmarked and can be spent 
for no other purpose. There is a specific accounting 
and auditing procedure set up to handle the fee and 
determine its efficiency. 
Even though the food service industry pays other taxes, 
those taxes are not intended to cover the costs of the 
Health Department. License fees defray the cost of other 
municipal and county agencies, but no license fee money 
goes to the Health Department. Food handler^permit fees 
are not paid by the food establishment. They are paid 
by the individual employee when he/she attends the class. 
)MMENT: Imposing this fee will set a precedent that other health 
departments will follow. Tried in Davis County and lost. 
?AFF RESPONSE: Imposing a permit or inspection fee to cover the costs 
of the department is not a new precedent. It has already 
been in practice several other programs within our 
Department and by other local health departments. Five 
local health departments, including Tooele County, Bear 
River District, Southeastern Health District, Wasatch 
County and Utah County, have set fees. The fees we have 
set are comparable to those being proposed in these other 
jurisdictions considering the size of the department and 
number of establishments in each jurisdiction. 
To say that the courts have ruled that a fee cannot be 
imposed because of the Davis County attempt is incorrect. 
That attempt failed because specific legal procedures 
were not followed in establishing the fee. Fees can be 
imposed if the legal procedures are followed. The Utah 
State Supreme Court ruled that in promulgating a fee, 
standard findings of fact should be entered that are 
comprehensive enough to allow determination if the fees 
have been designed and collected to actually defray some 
or all of the costs of inspecting food service establish-
ments. The Board of Health and the staff are following 
these legal procedures. 
MMENT: Once the fee is imposed, it will escalate and continue 
to increase. 
AFF RESPONSE: To assume the fee will not increase and to be a continued 
source of helping defray inspection cost in unrealistic. 
However, it should be kept in mind that the Health 
Department's practice of not increasing fees has been 
outstanding. A case in point is the milk inspection fee 
which has not increased in the past 8 years. In setting 
food inspection fees, any subsequent increases will be 
by the Board of Health and not the staff. The Board has 
always been sensitive to the needs of those affected by 
the fee increase. 
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Section A Page 1 a 
Food Service Inspection Fees 
Are Necessary Health Step 
In the area of public health 
protection, food service inspection 
should have top priority. There are 
more reported outbreaks of disease 
associated with food consumption 
than from all other environmental 
causes combined, according to the 
Utah State Health Department. 
But inspection staffs in the state's 
12 health districts historically have 
been grossly understaffed due to lack 
of funds. The result has been fewer 
inspections of public eating establish-
ments, sometimes only once a year 
rather than the legally-required once 
every six months, particularly in 
multi-county districts where great 
travel distances are involved. 
In a 1972 survey, 45 percent of the 
food service outlets in Utah were 
rated "inadequate" and, by law, 
could have been ordered closed for 
health reasons. A Bureau of Sanita-
tion survey just completed shows 
significant improvement overall, but 
restaurants scored worse than 
schools or taverns. 
The national formula for adequate 
health protection is one sanitarian 
per 15,000 population. On that basis, 
Utah is 41 sanitarians short. Davis 
County now has only five and should 
have 11. 
To help defray the cost of inspec-
tions and build up the program, Davis 
County Department of Health has 
taken a long-needed step of charging 
public food outlets a modest annual 
service fee. The Utah Restaurant 
Association is fighting the action, 
seeking a court injunction. 
The Davis County move stems from 
tightened state purse strings in recent 
years and follows a course outlined by 
the legislature. 
The burgeoning budget of the Utah 
Department of Health the past de-
cade, necessitated by growing state 
and federal demands on it, was 
deeply slashed below requests the 
past two general sessions. So deeply 
the previous health director resigned 
in protest that the department's 
mandatory responsibilities could not 
be carried out with the reduced 
appropriations. It was a case of slash 
vital services and the public be 
damned or assess fees to maintain 
them. 
In response, the legislature in 1981 
authorized the health department to 
charge for publications and services 
previously provided free. In protest-
ing the Davis County fees, the 
executive director of the restaurant 
association contends it was not the 
legislature's intent to include restaur-
ants in a fee system. But they are not 
exempted in the new law. It states 
broadly that "the department may 
adopt a schedule of fees that may be 
assessed for services rendered by the 
department, provided that such fees 
shall be reasonable and fair . . . " 
The Davis County schedule ap-
pears reasonable and fair, fees based 
on size and number of operating days 
annually, expected to cost each 
eating establishment between $15 
and $60 a year. That should impose no 
hardship on restaurant owners. 
There is ample precedent in 
charging the private sector for public 
services their activities necessitate. 
Builders pay for septic tank inspec-
tions and other services. Industry 
pays for health department review of 
pollution control plans. The dairy 
business pays inspection fees. 
The new restaurant fees are an 
appropiate investment in public 
health. The inspection program is 
essential and should be brought up to 
full strength rather than drift into 
neglect through lack of money. 
EXHIBIT _ £ 
MELVIN C. WILSON 
Davis County Attorney 
GERALD E. HESS - 1475 
Chief Civil Deputy 
Davis County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 618 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Telephone: 451-3227 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
HERSH IPAKTCHIAN dba HOBO : 
JO'S OF LAYTON, THE PEPPERCORN 
RESTAURANT, DON PEDRO'S : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
RESTAURANT, et al CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiffs, : 
Civil No. 41149 
vs. : 
DAVIS COUNTY BOARD OF HEALTH : 
Defendant. 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment came on regularly for hearing before 
the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, one of the judges of the above-
entitled court on the 9th day of June, 1987, with Gary E. Atkin 
appearing as Attorney for Plaintiffs and Gerald E. Hess from the 
Davis County Attorney's Office appearing as Attorney for the 
Defendant; and the court having reviewed the Affidavit of Grant 
Steed with attached exhibits and there being no Affidavits filed 
by Plaintiffs, and the court being fully advised in the premises, 
now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Under date of April 20, 1983 this court signed and 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
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in an action brought by Utah Restaurant Association, a Utah non-
profit corporation and Anthonys Inc., a Utah corporation dba 
Anthonys Restaurants against Davis County Board of Health, and 
identified as Civil No, 32743. 
2. The court concluded in its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law in Civil No. 32743 that: 
The Defendant failed to follow the statutory 
procedures for establishing its "Food Service 
Establishment Schedule" in that it failed to 
make formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and, therefore, said "Fee Schedule" and 
the charges imposed thereby are null and void. 
3. The court further concluded in Civil No. 32743 that, 
The attempted imposition of the "Food Service 
Establishment Permit Fee Schedule" by the 
Defendant constituted an attempt to raise a 
tax since the money was to go into the general 
fund of the County and not into reducing costs 
of inspection of restaurants by Defendant. It 
further constituted an attempt to raise a tax 
since there is no demonstrated logical nexis 
or relationship between the fees imposed and 
the cost of those inspections. Taxation is a 
legislative function and the legislature could 
not delegate such a taxing function to a local 
board of health. The Defendant acted in 
excess of its constitutional authority in 
attempting to impose those taxes in the form 
of that "Fee Schedule" and, therefore, said 
"Fee Schedule" and the charges imposed 
thereby, are null and void. 
4. Defendant, Davis County Board of Health has not 
collected or attempted to collect any monies from Plaintiffs 
under the Fee Schedule struck down by the court in its Judgment 
dated April 20, 1983 in Civil Case No. 32743. 
5. The Judgment of this court in Civil Case No. 3 274 3 
dated April 20, 1983 was appealed to the Supreme Court and the 
2 
Supreme Court rendered its decision in Utah Restaurant 
Association et al vs. Davis County Board of Health, 709 P2d 1159 
(Utah 1985). 
6. The Utah Supreme Court in Utah Restaurant 
Association et al vs. Davis County Board of Health, 709 P2d 1159 
(Utah 1985) upheld the lower court ruling that the Davis County 
Health Department had failed to follow the procedural 
requirements of the statute, but the Utah Supreme Court did not 
address the question of whether the inspection fee adopted was a 
"fee" allowed by the statute or a "tax". 
7. In Utah Restaurant Association et al vs. Davis 
County Board of Health, 709 P2d 1159 (Utah 1985) the Utah Supreme 
Court stated at page 1164 the following: 
However should the Davis County Board of 
Health again promulgate a similar fee 
regulation it would be well advised to do so 
in careful compliance with the procedures 
required by the local health department act. 
Findings of Fact should be entered that are 
sufficiently comprehensive to allow a 
reviewing court to assess whether the measure 
has been designed to actually defray some or 
all of the costs of inspecting the food 
service establishments on which it is imposed. 
(Citations deleted) The Findings should also 
demonstrate that there is some assurance 
that the money collected will be actually used 
to defray those costs. (Citations deleted) 
With such information in hand, a court 
reviewing any future challenge to a new rule 
should have little difficulty in determining 
the nature of the enactment. 
8. Grant Steed as Chairman of the Davis County Board of 
Health did cause to be published at least twice in the Davis 
County Clipper/Davis News Journal, a newspaper of general 
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circulation in the area of Davis County, a notice of a public 
hearing, which public hearing was scheduled for January 15, 1987 
at 7:00 p.m. 
9. On January 15, 1987 at 7:00 p.m. weather conditions 
had caused the electricity to be interrupted. Grant Steed 
appeared at the Davis County School District auditorium and 
announced that the public hearing was continued to January 21, 
1987 at 7:00 p.m. 
10. Grant Steed on behalf of the Davis County Board of 
Health posted notice of the postponement of the public hearing at 
the Davis County School'District auditorium, the place where the 
public hearing was to be conducted, and further Mr. Steed 
notified the newspapers of the postponement of the public 
hearing. 
11. On January 21, 1987 at 7:00 p.m. in the Davis 
County School District auditorium located in Farmington, Utah the 
Board of Health conducted a public hearing on the proposed Food 
Service/Food Establishment Permit Fee Schedule. 
12. On February 3, 1987 Defendant Davis County Board of 
Health approved an Order adopting the Food Service/Food 
Establishment Permit Fee Schedule to be in effect for the year 
1987 and each year thereafter until modified by the Davis County 
Board of Health. 
13. On February 3, 1987 the Davis County Board of 
Health approved Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
supporting its adoption of the Food Service/Food Establishment 
Permit Fee Schedule. 
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14. The Findings of Fact adopted by the Davis County 
Board of Health on February 3, 1987 are as follows: 
a. The Davis County Board of Health adopted the food 
service sanitation regulations on September 9, 1980. Included 
within Chapter 10 of the food service sanitation regulations was 
a program for issuing of permits, inspecting, and collecting a 
fee from food service establishments located within Davis County. 
b. Section 26-24-20, Utah Code Ann. (1953) as amended, 
states the following: 
The board may adopt rules, regulations and 
standards, not in conflict with rules of the 
department, necessary for the prevention of 
outbreaks and spread of communicable and 
infectious diseases that shall have the effect 
of law. Such rules, regulations and standards 
when adopted shall supersede existing local 
rules, regulations, standards and ordinances 
pertaining to similar subject matter. 
c. Section 26-24-14 states in part the following: 
A local health department shall have in 
addition to all other powers and duties 
imposed on it, the following powers and 
duties: 
1. Promote and protect the health and 
wellness of the people within the jurisdiction. 
2. Enforce state and local laws, 
regulations and standards relating to public 
health and sanitation. 
3. Investigate and control the causes of 
epidemic, infectious, communicable, and other 
diseases affecting the public health, and 
investigate and control the causes of 
environmental and occupational health hazards 
affecting the public health, and provide for 
the detection, reporting, prevention, and 
control of communicable, infectious, acute 
chronic or any other disease or health hazard 
considered dangerous or important or which may 
affect the public health. 
5. Enforce rules, regulations and 
standards adopted by the board: 
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8. Establish reasonable health programs 
not inconsistent with state law that are 
necessary or desirable for the promotion or 
protection of the public health and the 
control of disease or which may be necessary 
to ameliorate the major risk factors 
associated with the major causes of injury, 
sickness, death, and disability in the state. 
14. Establish and collect appropriate 
fees, to accept, use and administer all 
federal, state or private donations or grants 
of funds, property, services or material for 
public health purposes, and to make such 
agreements, not inconsistent with law, as may 
be required as a condition to receiving such 
donation or grant. 
d. In May, 1980, the Utah State Department of Health 
revised and re-implemented the Utah State Food Service 
Regulations. Local Health Departments are required by the 
regulation to maintain a minimum effort in a food service program 
which includes the requirement in Section 10-101 that food 
service facilities be inspected a minimum of two times per year. 
Also, the minimum performance standard established by the State 
Health Department will require that local Health Departments 
provide a food service program. 
e. The food service program in Davis County includes, 
but is not limited to, the inspection of food service facilities. 
However, in order to perform any inspection, the Environmental 
Health scientist performing the inspection must first be trained. 
He or she must have offices, telephones, equipment, insurance, 
transportation, supervision and clerical support. He or she must 
carry out follow-up activities, enforcement activities, 
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processing notices, and conducting hearings. In addition, the 
food service program also includes the training and testing of 
food handlers, epidemiologic investigations of suspected food-
borne illness outbreaks, plan and facility review, public 
information programs, laboratory services and complaint 
investigations. 
f. The most visible activity in the food service 
program is the inspection program. 
g. The inspections conducted by the Davis County Health 
Department on food service establishments range from the very 
routine to the very dramatic. Environmental Health scientists 
find themselves welcomed in many establishments and disdained in 
others. 
h. Inspections are a very necessary part of a food 
service program. 
i. Recently, during a routine inspection large pots of 
chili were found stored in a refrigerator. Due to the large 
volume of chili in each pot, the chili had not cooled 
sufficiently and was actually foaming due to the growth of 
microorganisms. Had the Health Department not inspected the 
establishment, the food would have been consumed and many patrons 
would have become ill. The food service establishment would have 
been exposed to liability from patrons who consumed the tainted 
food. The negative publicity, together with the loss paid to the 
poisoned patrons could have put the food service establishment 
out of business. As a result of the food service inspection the 
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food service operator knows how to rapidly cool food products and 
in the long run his business is more viable. The foregoing is 
simply an example of many, many incidents over the years where 
food service patrons have been protected. The general public 
health has been preserved and the food service industry has been 
strengthened. 
j. The total cost of food service program in Davis 
County during 1986 was $78,416. Total hours expended performing 
those functions were 3,840.5. Hours expended are broken down in 
the following categories: clerical, 1,219.5 hours; supervisory, 
241.5 hours; and environmental health scientists, 2,379.5 hours. 
k. A total of 406 food service/food establishments 
operate in Davis County. During 1986 the Health Department's 
environmental health and laboratory division carried out 1,274 
inspections. A total of 99 notices were issued pursuant to these 
inspections. Plans for 27 new or remodeled food service 
facilities were reviewed. Thirty-five suspected food-borne 
illness outbreaks were investigated. A total of 3,603 food 
handlers were tested and issued food handler permits. Seven 
hearings were conducted. 
1. During 1986, the food service program in Davis 
County was funded by $11,557 collected as permit fees from food 
handlers. The remainder of $66,859 was provided through the 
Health Department mill levy of the property tax. 
m. Over the past several years, there has been a 
strong shift in both federal and state government to providing 
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program funding whenever possible through user-type fees. The 
Environmental Protection Agency charges many fees. The State 
Health Department Division of Environmental Health has 
implemented and continues to implement more fees. Some examples 
of those fees are for air quality permits, water pollution 
control discharge permits, solid and hazardous waste disposal 
facility permits, asbestos removal permit fees, underground 
storage tank permit fees, laboratory fees, various plan review 
fees, and various operator certification fees. Most of these 
programs with fees and permits require many of the same program 
activities as the food service program, such as inspections, 
enforcement, hearings, and benefit the public at large, as well 
as the specific individual to whom the fee is charged. The Davis 
County Health Department receives no funding from the sources 
identified above. 
n. The Davis County Health Department currently 
charges a number of fees such as septic tank permit fees, 
swimming pool permit fees, immunization fees, laboratory fees, 
vehicle emission fees, scavenger and salvage permit fees, 
inspection station permit fees, mechanic permit fees, well-baby 
fees, etc. Most of these programs with fees have many of the 
same types of program activities as the food service program, 
such as inspections, enforcement, hearings, and benefit the 
public at large as well as the specific individuals to whom the 
fee is charged. 
o. Currently, 85% of the food service/food program is 
funded from the Health Department mill levy and 15% from food 
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handler's permits. None of the other fees identified in the next 
preceding paragraph are used to fund the food service program. 
p. If the proposed fee schedule is implemented, 
approximately $30,000 will be generated. That would provide 
funding for the food program at 47% from property taxes, 38% from 
food service/food permit fees, and 15% from food handler permit 
fees. 
q. All funds collected from the proposed permit fee 
would be placed in the Health Department fund which has been 
established by Davis County in accordance with Section 26-24-18, 
Utah Code Ann. (1953) as amended, and the funds will be expended 
only in the food service/food program. 
r. The Davis County Treasurer serves as the treasurer 
of the local Health Department in accordance with Section 26-24-
17, Utah Code Ann. (1953) as amended. 
s. The Davis County Treasurer has created a Health 
Department fund. All appropriations from the general fund, all 
fees collected by the Health Department and any donations 
received by the Health Department are deposited into the Health 
Department fund. 
t. Any monies deposited in the local Health Department 
fund are expended only for maintenance and operation of the local 
Health Department. 
u. Any fees that are collected from the proposed 
restaurant inspection fee will be deposited in the Health 
Department fund and will be only used to actually defray some or 
all of the cost of the food service inspection program. 
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v. Attempts have been made by the Health Department to 
assess an equitable way to compute the inspection fees. Many 
methods were looked at, such as gross revenues of the 
establishment, seating capacity alone, square footage alone, 
number of employees, number of people served, and a flat rate. 
After careful review and study, a combination of service base, 
seating capacity, and square footage most accurately reflect the 
varying complexity of food service/food establishments. 
Evaluation of the cost of the fees to the food service 
establishment and the patrons served was also considered. With 
the maximum fee of $100 and an establishment serving one hundred 
customers per day, the cost per customer served would be $.0027 
or 27/100 of a cent. The cost of the inspection fee will be more 
than likely passed on to the patrons, thus, those who use food 
service/food establishments will pay a higher portion of the cost 
of the inspection fee. 
w. Hersh Ipaktchian, a restaurant owner, declared that 
the amount of the fee is not the real issue. The real concern is 
the precedent the fee establishes. He indicated that if Health 
Departments can assess special fees, then his fear is that the 
police department, fire department and street departments will 
soon follow. 
x. Mr. Ipaktchian and Max T. Fillmore, president of 
the Utah Restaurant Association, both expressed concern that 
since the health inspections are required by law as a service to 
the general public, the inspection program should be paid for 
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through general public taxes and not from an inspection fee 
assessed against the restaurant industry. In addition, Mr. 
Ipaktchian indicated the restaurant industry already contributes 
to the health inspection program through fees for health 
inspection permits paid by each of the employees of the 
restaurants. Mr. Ipaktchian also indicated without facts or 
verification that the restaurants and business in general 
shoulder an inequitable tax burden for county government through 
a variety of other taxes. He did not specify the other taxes 
that he made reference to. 
y. Max Fillmore, president of the Utah Restaurant 
Association, said that the Health Department inspections of food 
service and related business is clearly a public health service 
for the protection of the general public. He indicated that four 
out of every ten meals in the United States are eaten away from 
home. 
15. The Conclusions of Law adopted by the Davis County 
Board of Health on February 3, 1987 are as follows: 
a. By state statute and through regulations adopted by 
the State Department of Health, the Davis County Board of Health 
has the obligation to inspect food service establishments located 
within Davis County. 
b. By authority of Utah State law, the Board of Health 
has authority to impose a restaurant inspection fee to offset all 
or a portion of the cost of a food service and food service 
inspection program. 
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c. The food service program of Davis County includes 
but is not limited to inspections, clerical support, 
transportation, hearings and the cost of personnel to perform 
inspections. 
d. The imposition of the proposed permit fee will 
partially offset the total cost of the food service program while 
the remainder of the cost to offset the food service program will 
come from general property tax revenues and from food handler 
permit fee. 
e. The general public will be benefitted by the food 
service program, the individual restaurant patron will be 
benefitted by the food service program and the restaurant 
business will be likewise benefitted by the food service program. 
f. The fees collected by the Davis County Health 
Department will be deposited in the Health Fund and can only be 
used and will be actually used to defray all or a portion of the 
costs of the food service program. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the court now makes 
and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiffs are not entitled to Summary Judgment as a 
matter of law because they failed to meet all four of the tests 
required before collateral estoppel may apply. In particular 
Plaintiffs failed to establish that the identical issue, meaning 
the identical factual issue, was decided in a prior adjudication 
against the Defendant Davis County Board of Health. Many of the 
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facts upon which the Davis County Board of Health relied for its 
adoption of the Permit Fee Schedule were not even in existence at 
the time the prior lawsuit was decided. 
2. The Utah Supreme Court explicitly left open the 
validity of a subsequent Permit Fee Schedule, invalidating the 
prior schedule on procedural grounds only. 
3. Section 26-24-14 (14) Utah Code Annotated 1953 as 
amended gives Defendant authority to "establish and collect 
appropriate fees." 
4. Defendant followed and complied with all of the 
procedural requirements set forth in Section 26-24-20 Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 as amended. 
5. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law adopted 
by Defendant demonstrate that the Permit Fee Schedule is 
designed to actually defray some or all of the costs of 
inspecting the food service establishments on which it will be 
imposed. 
6. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law adopted 
by the Defendant provide assurance that the money collected from 
the Permit Fee will actually be used to defray some or all of the 
costs of the inspection because the money will be placed in a 
separate fund established by the County Treasurer for the Health 
Department so that every assurance is made that the monies from 
the fees will be used to support the program. 
7. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be 
granted declaring that the Food Service/Food Establishment Permit 
Fee Schedule adopted by Defendant on February 3, 1987 is valid. 
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DATED this day of July, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
District Court Judge 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to: 
Gary E. Atkin 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
185 South State Street, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
with postage prepaid thereon, this n j AJ~ day of f r ,1987-
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